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NOTES
Dependents' Pregnancy-Related Medical Benefits and
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination
in employment on the basis of sex. In 1978, Congress amended Title
V112 with the express purpose of reversing an earlier Supreme Court
decision3, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,4 in which the Court held that
exclusion of pregnancy coverage from a disability-benefits plan did not
constitute sex-based discrimination under Title VII.5 The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (PDA)6 defines "sex" under Title VII to include
pregnancy or pregnancy-related conditions, and thus establishes that
discrimination in employment on the basis of pregnancy constitutes
discrimination on the basis of sex.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-6 (1976). Section 703 provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
ongin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(aX1976).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. IV 1980). See infra note 6 and accompanying text.
3. 123 CONo. REc. 29,641 (1977) (remarks of Senator Bayh) ("This legislation was made
necessary by an unfortunate decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Gilbert v.
General MTecti [sic] ... "). See, ag., H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1978)
repried in in 1978 U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEws 4749 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT];
Legisiaton to Prohibit Sex Discriintion on the Barr of Pregnancy: Hearings on HR. 5055 and
HR. 6075 Before the Subcomm on Employment Opportumites of the House ComnL on Education
andLabor, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as House HEARiNGS]; 123 CONG. REC.
7539 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
4. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
5. See i*r text accompanying notes 13-22.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. IV 1980). The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)
provides in pertinent part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pre.nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar m their ability or inability
to work.
Ad
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Although the PDA clearly prohibits pregnancy discrimination
against female employees, there is confusion in the courts7 and among
commentators8 over the scope of the Act's coverage. The Courts of
Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits have addressed this issue in
recent cases 9 involving medical plans that provide comprehensive
coverage for spouses and dependents of employees but exclude or
provide less coverage for spouses' and dependents' pregnancy-related
disabilities. These courts have focused on whether the Act applies to
female employees only. or extends to female dependents of male
employees, and have reached opposite conclusions.
This note examines the language and legislative history of the
PDA and concludes that the amendment applies to female employees
only.'0 Even though the Act does not reach pregnancy discrimination
involving employee spouses or dependents, however, the
discrimination may nevertheless be illegal under general Title VII case
law, depending on the kind of insurance plan involved and the analytic
framework the court uses to evaluate those plans."
I. BACKGROUND
A. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert
In GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert,'2 female employees' 3 of the Gen-
eral Electric Company challenged the company's disability plan under
7. See infra note 9.
8. See, eg., Wald, Judicial Construction of the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to
Title VIP Ignoring Congressional Intent, 31 AM. U.L. REv. 591, 601 (1982) (the Act applies to
dependents); Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal
Protection *17th Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEo. L.J. 641, 682 (1981)
(PDA provides that pregnancy rule is never neutral); Note, Employment Discrimination-'Sex
Discrimination" Under Title VII includes Difjerential Treatment of Pregnancy Related Disabilities,
45 Mo. L. REv. 145, 151 (1980) (literal reading of PDA indicates exclusion of pregnancy from
dependents' benefits unlawful); The Pregnancy Disability /sic/Act: Does It ProtectAll Women?, 5
WOMEN'S L. REP. 1, 5 (June, 1982) (PDA applies only to employees).
9. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1982),
revyg 510 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. Va. 1981), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3442 (U. S. Dec. 6, 1982) (No.
82-411); EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 680 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982).
This issue has also been addressed in a number of other jurisdictions. See EEOC v. Emerson
Elec. Co., 539 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. Mo. 1982); United Teachers-Los Angeles v. Board of Educ., 29
EmpL Prac. Dec. (CCH) 32,759 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 1982); EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co.,
524 F. Supp. 1141 (N.D. Ill. 1981), appealfiled, No. 82-1634 (7th Cir. 1982); Kansas Ass'n of
Commerce & Ind. v. EEOC, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1343 (D. Kan. 1980).
10. See infra notes 49-76 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
12. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
13. Gilbert involved a class action by employees and former employees who had been preg-
nant and were denied benefits. .1d. at 128-29.
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Title VII.14 The plan provided employees nonoccupational sickness
and accident coverage, but excluded coverage for pregnancy-related
disabilities. Drawing on its earlier equal protection analysis of a simi-
lar disability plan in Geduldig v. Aiello,15 the Supreme Court reasoned
that plans excluding pregnancy-related disabilities affect two groups-
pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.1 6 Because one group is fe-
male but the other is male and female, the Court found a "lack of iden-
tity between the excluded disability and gender."' 7 The Court held,
therefore, that the pregnancy classifications in General Electric's em-
ployee disability plan were not gender-based and were valid under Ti-
tle VII.
The Court recognized that under either a Constitutional' 8 or a Ti-
tle VII analysis,' 9 even a facially neutral distinction would be imper-
14. See infra note 19.
15. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). The Geduldig Court upheld the constitutionality of a California
disability insurance program that excluded pregnancy-related disabilities from coverage. The
plan, funded by employees, was mandatory for those privately employed and not otherwise cov-
ered by a private voluntary disability plan approved by the State. 417 U.S. at 486-87. The Court
held that the program did not violate the equal protection clause and that California had a "legiti-
mate interest" in keeping the insurance program self-supporting, without increasing the employee
crntribution rate. 417 U.S. at 494-96.
16. Quoting from Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), the Gilbert court stated:
This case is thus a far cry from cases like Reed v. Reed... and Frontiero v. Richard-
son. . . involving discrimination based upon gender as such. The California insurance
program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely
removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities.
While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every
legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like those con-
sidered in Reed... and Frontiero.
429 U.S. at 134 (citations omitted).
17. 429 U.S. at 135 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20).
18. Plaintiffs bringing a sex discrimination case under the fifth or fourteenth amendments
must show either that the challenged classification is based overtly on gender or, if gender-neutral,
that its adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based discrimination. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979); see alro Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). (The invidious
quality of a law claimed to be discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a discriminatory pur-
pose). See generally Erickson, Pregnancy Dscrimination" An Analytical Approach, 5 WOMEN'S
RTs. L. REP. 83 (1979); Thomas, Differential Treatment of Pregnancy in Employee Disability Benq
rogram" 7tle VllandEquadPrtectlon Clause Analysis, 60 Op- L REv. 249 (1981). In order to
maintain a classification based on sex, the defendant must show that the classification serves "im-
portant governmental objectives" and is "substantially related to the achievement of those objec-
tives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
Because of the requirement of "state action" for bringing an action under the fifth or four-
teenth amendments, employees in the private sector normally rely on Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. Title VII applies to an employer with 15 or more employees. In 1972, Congress
amended Title VII to cover state government employees as well. See Wald, supra note 8, at 593
n.12.
19. There are several ways to prove a prima facie sex discrimination case under Title VII.
The first is to establish that a classification or practice is based on sex, resulting in "treatment of a
person in a manner which but for that person's sex would be different." City of Los Angeles Dept.
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missible if "it were in fact a subterfuge to accomplish a forbidden
discrimination." 20 The Court found no evidence, however, of a hidden
intent to discriminate against women. Nor did the Court find sufficient
disproportionate impact on women to support an inference of sex dis-
crimination.2' Focusing on the risks included in the plan rather than
on the risks excluded, the Court concluded that the plan was legal ab-
sent either proof that the plan discriminated against males or females
in terms of "aggfegate risk protection '22 or evidence that the plan ben-
efited men more than women.
The following year, the Supreme Court again examined a disabil-
ity plan that did not include pregnancy coverage. In Nashville Gas Co.
v. Sally, 23 the Court found the company's sick leave plan indistin-
guishable from that in Gilbert and, therefore, not a per se violation of
Title VII. It held, however, that the company's policy of denying wo-
men on pregnancy leave their accumulated seniority did violate section
703(a)(2) of Title VII. Unlike Gilbert, in which the employer refused to
extend to women a beneft men do not receive, in Salty, the employer
imposed a burden on women that men need not bear.24 The Salty deci-
of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400
U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (violation of Title VII to have one policy for men and one policy for women
with like qualifications).
.A practice can also be challenged under a "disparate treatment" theory. "Disparate treat-
ment" occurs when an employer treats some employees less favorably than others. For example,
refusing to hire or promote employees, because of their race or sex is "disparate treatment." Proof
of discriminatory motive is necessary, although it can be inferred in some cases. International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977); see also Texas Dep't. of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (appropriate analysis of disparate treatment case); McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (proper burden of proof in disparate treat-
ment case). See generally, Note, Evidentiary Burden of Proof in Title VII Employment
Discrimination Cases: Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 24. How. L.J. 333 (1982).
An employment classification or practice, neutral on its face, can be challenged under Title VII if
it has a substantially adverse impact on a particular class. Under this theory, a plaintiff need not
show intent, but must prove a significantly discriminatory effect. See generally Erickson, supra
note 18, at 11.
Once a prima facie case is established, the defendant must present a business necessity de-
fense, indicating that the challenged practice or classification is related to job performance.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977) (disparate impact analysis of Griggs and Albemarle applies to sex discrimination cases);
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (procedure for establishing disparate impact).
See generally I A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §§ 11.00-12A.50 (1981).
20. 429 U.S. at 136; see supra note 19 (proving intent).
21. 429 U.S. at 138-39. See supra note 19 (inferring sex discrimination from disparate
impact).
22. 429 U.S. at 138.
23. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
24. 434 U.S. at 142. In Saity, only employees taking a leave of absence because of pregnancy
lost their seniority rights. Other male and female employees, taking leave for nonpregnancy-re-
lated disabilities, retained their accumulated seniority.
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-sion, although indicating that in some instances pregnancy classifica-
tions are unlawful, left unclear when courts ought to apply the Satly
benefit-burden test.25 In the face of such uncertainty and the unaccept-
able holding of Gilbert,2 6 Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act in 1978.
B. The Courts of Appeals' Decisions
Congress enacted the PDA to clarify the definition of sex discrimi-
nation under Title VII. The PDA specifies that sex discrimination in-
cludes discrimination "on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions."27 Although the Act requires employers to treat
Women "affected by pregnancy" the same for all "employment-related
purposes" as they would other disabled employees,28 it is not limited
expressly to female employees. Therefore, some courts have interpreted
the Act as prohibiting differential treatment of the pregnancy-related
conditions of employee dependents. The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, in the broadest interpretation of the Act to date, held
that if an insurance plan provides full coverage for spouses of female
employees, it must provide similar coverage for the pregnancy-related
expenses of spouses of male employees.29 Conversely, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that the language and legislative his-
tory of the PDA limit the scope of the Act to female employees, 30 and
thus concluded that a plan excluding pregnancy-related health benefits
for dependents does not violate Title VII.
1. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC.3' In
Newport News, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit analyzed a
25. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 3. Under the Sarty benefit-burden test, although em-
ployers were not required to provide benefits such as pregnancy coverage to their female employ-
ees, they could not burden women by depriving them of employment opportunities, 434 U.S. at 142,
such as withdrawing the accumulated seniority of women on pregnancy leave.
26. See S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT].
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. IV 1980);seejupra note 6; SENATE REPORT, supra note 26, at
3.
28. According to the Senate Report, "[pregnant women who are able to work must be per-
mitted to work [under] the same conditions as other employees; and when they are not able to
work for medical reasons, they must be accorded the same rights, leave privileges and other bene-
fits, as other workers who are disabled from working." SENATE REPORT, supra note 26, at 4.
29. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1982);
accord United Teachers--Los Angeles v. Board of Educ., 29 EmpL Prac. Dec. (CCH) 32,759
(C.D. Cal. 1982).
30. EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 680 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982); accord EEOC v.
Emerson Elec. Co, 539 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. Mo. 1982); EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 524 F.
Supp. 1141 (N.D. Ill. 1981), appealfled, No. 82-1634 (7th Cir. 1982).
31. 667 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3422 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1982) (No. 82-4111).
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health insurance plan that provided the full cost of hospitalization and
a specified percentage of medical expenses for dependents of employ-
ees, but offered more limited hospital coverage for employees' spouses
hospitalized for a routine pregnancy. 32 The court examined the lan-
guage of the PDA and concluded that the Act is not limited to female
employees. Assuming that "women affected by pregnancy" can refer to
spouses of male employees, 33 the court decided that the "ability or in-
ability to work"34 language does not necessarily imply that the spouse
"must be an employee of the employer providing the coverage."3 5
Turning to the legislative history of the Act, the court referred to
the remarks of Senators Bayh and Cranston. Both expressed the belief
that pregnancy coverage could not be excluded from policies covering
employee spouses.36 The court reasoned that, although the Senate Re-
port left open the question of dependents' pregnancy benefits, the ap-
propriate law to apply is Title VII as amended by the PDA.3 7
Interpreting the PDA as overruling both the specific holding of Gilbert
and the reasoning on which it was based, the court observed' "Distinc-
tions based on pregnancy the Congress said, are distinctions based on
sex."'38 Therefore, the court found that a plan providing less complete
coverage for married male employees than for married female employ-
ees discriminated on the basis of sex.
2. EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.3 9 In Lockheed, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined a medical benefits
plan that excluded from coverage expenses related to dependents'
pregnancies. In interpreting the language of the PDA as limited to fe-
male employees, the court reasoned that, as a result of the amendment,
the phrase "because of sex" in section 703(a)(1) includes "because of
.. . pregnancy."40 With that clarification in mind, the court read sec-
tion 703(a)(1) to prohibit discrimination against "any individual with
respect to his compensation. . . because of such individual's. . preg-
32. Id at 449.
33. When an employer considers extension of medical benefits to the spouses of employ-
ees, it does so with an "employment-related purpose" just as it does when it considers the
extension of such benefits to employees. Benefits would never be extended to spouses if
the extension did not serve an employment-related purpose.
667 F.2d at 450.
34. See supra note 6.
35. 667 F.2d at 45 1. See infra text accompanying notes 54-59.
36. See 667 F.2d at 451; infra note 68 and text accompanying notes 69-70.
37. 667 F.2d at 451.
38. Id
39. 680 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982).
40. 680 F.2d at 1245.
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nancy .... .,41 The court concluded that this section could "hardly be
read to apply to male employees. By choosing the definitional form of
amendment, Congress has expressly limited the scope of... [the
PDA] to women employees." 42
The court found further support for its view in the Act's legislative
history. Focusing on the Senate Report in which the Human Resources
Committee stated that questions regarding dependents' pregnancy ben-
efits should be determined "on the basis of existing Title VII princi-
ples," 43 the court held that Congress expressly chose not to resolve the
issue in the PDA, referring its resolution to the principles established in
case law" and existing at the time the PDA was under consideration.
Applying General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the court then concluded that
exclusion of pregnancy benefits to spouses of male employees is not
gender-based discrimination 4 5
II. THE PDA: LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Both the Newport News and Lockheed courts construed the lan-
guage and legislative history of the PDA to support their conflicting
interpretations of the scope of the Act. However, careful examination
of these areas supports the Lockheed court's refusal to apply the Act to
dependents. The most obvious meaning of the statutory language lim-
its its application to female employees affected by pregnancy.46 More-
over, the legislative history of the PDA supports such a construction:47
Congress passed the PDA to correct the damaging effects of the Gilbert
decision on women's employment opportunities,48 not to ensure preg-
nancy coverage for all women whether employed or not.
A. Statutory Language.
The PDA amended the definitional section of Title VII. The first
clause of the Act states that "sex" as used in Title VII will now include
"pregnancy" as a part of its meaning.49 Standing alone, the clause ap-
41. Id (emphasis in original).
42. Id
43. Id at 1246. See infra text accompanying note 70.
44. 680 F.2d at 1246.
45. Id at 1247.
46. See kfra text accompanying notes 49-56.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 60-76.
48. See Discrininatlon on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977 Hearings on S. 995 Before the Sub-
ComMr on Labor of the Senate Com. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1977) (state-
ment of Sen. Mathias) [hereinafter cited as SENATE HEARINGS].
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(k) (Supp. IV 1980); see supra note 6.
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pears to be broadly applicable to any pregnancy-based distinction.50
Because the PDA is included in the definitional section of Title VII,
however, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit appropriately read
the clause in conjunction with section 703(a)(1): 51 an employer may not
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms ... or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
... sex .... -52 Because sex can be read to mean pregnancy under the
PDA, the seemingly broad scope of the first clause is limited to employ-
ees who are or will be pregnant.53
The second clause of the PDA further indicates that the Act is
limited to female employees by introducing a standard of comparabil-
ity4 that can reasonably be understood only within the context of the
employer-employee relationship: "women affected by pregnancy.
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes. . . as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work."55 The plain meaning5 6 of the "ability to work" clause is that
employers should treat pregnant workers as they do any other worker.
The Newport News court argued, however, that "women affected by
pregnancy" can refer to women who are not necessarily employees of
the employer providing the coverage-for example, employees'
wives.57 But as the dissenting judge in that opinion noted, such an in-
50. It is a rule of statutory construction, however, that in order to determine the meaning of a
clause, "one must proceed as he would with any other composition--construe it with reference to
the leading idea or purpose of the whole instrument... . [Elach part or section should be con-
strued in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole." 2A J.
SUTHERLAND, SiATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.05, at 56 (4th ed. 1973); see also Federal Power
Comm'n v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498, 514 (1949). ("If possible, all sections of an
act must be reconciled so as to produce a symmetrical whole.").
51. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1976) (emphasis added); see supra note 1.
53. Employers may not discriminate against any "individual because of such individual's
pregnancy." 680 F.2d at 1245 (emphasis in original).
54. In the Senate floor debates on the Amendment, Senator Cranston stated that its "basic
standard is comparability among employees." 123 CONG. REc. 29,663 (1977).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. IV 1980); see supra note 6. For example, if disabled workers are
allotted a certain number of weeks of paid leave then pregnant workers ought to receive the same
number if they are disabled by pregnancy. If sick workers receive hospitalization and medical
costs for conditions not related to work, pregnant workers should receive the same benefits for
their maternity costs. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 4.
56. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1917) ("statutory words are uni-
formly presumed... to be used in their ordinary and usual sense, and with the meaning com-
monly attributed to them"); see also Avery v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 210, 214 (1924) (statutory
words should be given ordinary meaning); United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 651 (4th Cir.
1974).
57. Congress probably did not use the more specific "employees" affected by pregnancy be-
cause Title VII applies to applicants for employment and conceivably to terminated employees
who are still entitled to benefit rights. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1976). See supra note I.
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terpretation makes no sense alongside the comparability standard of
the clause: "To determine whether a pregnant woman is being treated
the same as some other person who has the similar ability or inability
to work, the pregnant woman, by logical necessity, must also be an
employee. To hold otherwise is simply to ignore the language of the
Act."581 Moreover, if Congress had intended that the PDA apply as
broadly as the Newport News court suggests, Congress presumably
would have protected 'Persons affected by pregnancy" and then indi-
cated the appropriate comparability standard when female employees
are pregnant. This language would cover male employees adversely af-
fected by a dependent's pregnancy. Instead, Congress chose to limit
the Act to "women affected by pregnancy."' 59
B. Legislative History.
1. Objectives of the PDA. Congressional supporters of the PDA
found the social implications of the Gilbert decision unacceptable.6
They reasoned that a central purpose of Title VI-to ensure the equal-
ity of women in the workplace-would be undermined if Gilbert were
allowed to stand.61 As the House and Senate Reports emphasized, at
the core of the sexual stereotypes that result in unfavorable treatment
of women in employment is the employer's assumption that women
will eventually become pregnant and leave the labor market.6 2 Em-
ployers who espouse such stereotypes view women as unreliable work-
ers and are reluctant to give them jobs with responsibility. Sponsors of
the PDA worried that Gilbert would allow employers to act on such
stereotypes, thereby undermining the equal opportunity goals of Title
V]1. 63 Thus, the PDA was introduced with the express purpose of pro-
viding "relief' to the working women of America.64
58. 667 F.2d at 452.
59. See Brief for Appellee at 15, EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 524 F. Supp. 1141
(N.D. 111. 1981), appealfled. No. 81-1634 (7th Cir. 1982).
60. Sm ,tg., SENATE HEARINGS, supra note 43, at 27 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("Recent
setbacks in the ... Supreme Court's decision in the Gilbert case mean that the Congress must be
especially alert to ensure that its intent to halt sex discrimination is fully understood by the courts
... "); 123 CONo. REc. 29,641 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
61. SENATE HEA'.~osara note 48, at I (Gilbert constituted a "major setback" in the battle
for women's rights and posed a serious threat to the development of anti-discrimination policies.);
123 CONo. REc. 7539 (1977).
62. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 3; SENATE REPORT, supra note 26, at 3.
63. Because of Gibert, employers would be free to force women to stop work because of
pregnancy regardless of their ability to continue, refuse to hire or promote pregnant women, or
otherwise limit their employment opportunities. SENATE REPORT, =pra note 26, at 6.
64. 123 CONG. Rc. 7540 (1977).
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The goal of the PDA was not to alter the basic principles of Title
VII, but to clarify Congress's original intent in enacting that section of
the Civil Rights Act.65 That original intent, explained in the Senate
Report, was correctly expressed in the EEOC's 1972 Guidelines, which
"made clear that excluding applicants or employees from employment
because of pregnancy. .. was a violation of Title VII, and specifically
required employers to treat disabilities caused... by pregnancy...
as all other temporary disabilities."' ' Thus, the PDA clarified original
congressional intent by prohibiting discrimination against employees
on the basis of their pregnancy. The repeated references to "working
women" and "the female workforce" made by the Act's sponsors67 and
by those congressmen who addressed the bill in the floor debates are
further evidence of Congress's intent to limit the reach of the Act to
female employees.68
2. The Question of Dependents' Benefits. The question of depen-
dents' benefits arose during the Senate Committee hearings and floor
debate on the amendment. Senator Bayh, a sponsor of the PDA, of-
fered his personal view that dependents should receive coverage:
While it is difficult to second-guess the courts, I feel that the history
of sex discrimination cases under the 14th amendment in addition to
previous interpretations of the Title VII regulations relating to the
treatment of dependents will require that if companies choose to pro-
65. HOUSE REPORT, .lpra note 3, at 4.
66. SENATE REPORT, supra note 26, at 2. See generalo , Williams, supra note 8, at 673-74.
The Gilbert Court rejected the EEOC's 1972 interpretation. 429 U.S. at 140-46 (1976).
67. See, eg., 123 CONO. REC. 7540 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("working women
throughout our Nation from varied walks of life are in need of relief."); SENATE HEARINGS, supra
note 48, at 5 (statement of Committee Chairman, Sen. Williams) (the issue before the committee is
the recognition of working women as full and equal participants in the workplace); id at 21 (state-
ment of Sen. Mathias) (Gilbert posed "grave consequences for the female work force in America"
which this legislation will counteract.); id at 27 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("Mhe time has
come for Congress to guarantee to the 39 million working women of this Nation that sex discrimi-
nation in employment is ended."); 123 CONG. REc. 29,643 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Bayh)
("[Florty-five percent of all married women are now in the work force, and this Nation owes these
women equal protection under our laws.").
68. See, ag., 124 CONG. REC. 21,437 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Green) (This act "affords work-
ing-women the opportunity for comprehensive medical protection which men have .. "); id at
21,439 (remarks of Rep. Quie) ("[This is necessary in order for women employees to enjoy equal
treatment.. . ."); Id (remarks of Rep. Akaka) ("he bill simply requires that pregnant workers
be fairly and equally treated."). As the Senate Report emphasized, the amendment was intro-
duced to ensure that working women were protected against employment discrimination; its basic
principal was that "[piregnant women who are able to work must be permitted to work on the
same conditions as other employees. . . when they are not able to work for medical reasons, they
must be afforded the same rights... as other workers...." SENATE REPORT, supra note 26, at
3-4. Senator Cranston expressed his personal view that the Act should be construed to apply to
dependents but admitted that the Senate Committee to which the bill was referred did not directly
answer the question. 123 CONG. REc. 29,663 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Cranston).
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vide fill coverage to the dependents of their female employees, then
they must provide such complete coverage to the dependents of their
male employees.69
If the PDA reaches dependents, such unequal coverage would present a
prima facie case of sex discrimination. That Senator Bayh did not
mention this possibility suggests that he did not believe the PDA re-
solved the issue; rather, he believed that dependent coverage is re-
quired by equal protection and Title VII standards as developed in case
law.
The Senate Report on the PDA came to a similar conclusion:
Questions were raised in the committee's deliberations regarding
how this bill would affect medical coverage for dependents of em-
ployees, as opposed to employees themselves. In this context it must,
be remembered that the basic purpose of this bill is to protect women
employees; it does not alter the basic principles of Title VII law as
regards sex discrimination. Rather, this legislation clarifies the defi-
nition of sex discrimination for Title VII purposes. Therefore the
question in regard to dependents' benefits would be determined on
the basis of existing Title VII principles.70
The Report underscored the basic purpose of the PDA--to protect fe-
male employees-but refused to apply the Act to pregnancy classifica-
tions that concerned nonemployees. Rather, questions involving the
pregnancy coverage of dependents remain open, to be decided by the
courts on an individual basis.
Cost estimates of the amendment also suggest that the PDA was
presented to Congress in terms of its application to women employ-
ees.71 The committee discussions and floor debates over the economic
impact of the Act focused on the cost of covering pregnant working
women, not the cost of covering dependents.7 2 For example, when
Senator Hatch asserted that the Act would benefit pregnant women,
but males and nonpregnant women would bear a "substantial share'of
69. 123 CoNG. REC. 29,642 (1977) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
70. SENATE REPORT, spra note 26, at 5-6.
71. In the Senate debates, Senator Bayh presented statistics on working women only. He
concentrated on the rising number of working mothers in the U.S., and on the fact that 70% of
them work because of economic hardship. 123 CONO. REC. 29,641 (1977); see also HOUSE RE-
PORT, =npra note 3, at 9, in which the cost estimate of the Act refers only to employee coverage;
HOUSE HEAiNGS, supra note 3, at 101, 180-84 (Labor Dept. tables predicting birth rates and birth
rates by industry for women workers).
Note, however, that cost estimates for health insurance were excluded because of difficulties
in predicting future maternity expenses. If there were any indication in the cost estimates that the
PDA extended to dependents, it would most likely appear in the health insurance tables rather
than in those for disability benefits. A Congressman voting on the bill, however, was familiar with
statistics on working women only.
72. See supra note 71; see also 123 CONG. REc. 29,642 (1977).
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the cost burden,"73 he obviously did not consider dependents' coverage;
had the PDA reached dependents, males would not necessarily have
been disproportionately burdened by the added cost because their
wives would have been covered. It is reasonable to assume that other
members of Congress similarly believed that the costs were projected in
terms of only women employees.
Finally, in the Senate debates over the amendment, a revealing
discussion took place between Senators Hatch and Williams concern-
ing the dependents' benefits issue.' 4 In that colloquy, Senator Williams
unequivocaly agreed that the PDA "only applies to the particular wo-
man who is actually pregnant, who is an employee and has become
pregnant after her employment."'75 Because Senator Williams was
principal sponsor of the PDA, his remarks are "an authoritative guide
to the statute's construction."'76 Therefore, his unreserved assertion
that the PDA reaches only employees should be afforded great weight
in determining congressional intent concerning the scope of the Act.
C. The EEOC Guidelines.
The EEOC Guidelines77 on the proper interpretation of the PDA
contain a "question and answer" section that includes a discussion of
pregnancy coverage of dependents. 78 The answer to question 21 states
that if spouses of female employees receive medical coverage, then
spouses of male employees must be afforded equal coverage, including
coverage of pregnancy-related conditions.79 The standards the EEOC
73. 123 CONG. REc. 29,645 (1977) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
74. Mr. HATCH. [I]t is arguable that spouses of male employees are covered by this
civil rights amendment. One might even argue that other female dependents are covered
I want to be sure that everybody knows from the record that it only refers to the
woman employee who is pregnant or who becomes pregnant after her employment.
Mr. WILLIAMS.... I do not see how one can read into this any pregnancy other than
that pregnancy that relates to the employee ....
Mr. HATCH. So the Senator is satisfied that, though the committee language I brought
up, "woman affected by pregnancy" seems to be ambiguous, what it means is that this
act only applies to the particular woman who is actually pregnant, who is an employee
and has become pregnant after her employment?
Mr. WILLIAMS. Exactly.
123 CONG. REc. 29,644 (1977).
75. Id.
76. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 102 S.Ct. 1912, 1921 (1982); see also Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1950) ("It is the sponsor that we look to when the
meaning of the statutory words is in doubt.") See generally 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.15, at 221 (4th ed. 1973).
77. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1982).
78. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 & app. (1982).
79. 21.Q. Must an employer provide health insurance coverage for the medical ex-
penses of pregnancy-related conditions of the spouses of male employees? Of the depen-
dents of all employees?
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used in answering question 21 are unclear, however. In the 1979 Intro-
duction to the Guidelines, the Commission admitted that because the
PDA did not "directly" resolve the dependents' benefits issue, it ap-
plied "existing" Title VII principles in answering the question,80 but
the Commission failed to specify whether those principles were based
on Title VII case law as amended by the PDA, or on pre-PDA case
law.81
Even if the EEOC applied the PDA82 in answering question 21, its
conclusion is not dispositive. EEOC Guidelines are only interpretive
rules meant to have the "power to persuade but lacking the power to
control. '8 3 Although at one time the Supreme Court viewed the
agency as entitled to "great deference,"8' 4 courts do not give much
weight to the Guidelines85 when the rules are inconsistent with con-
gressional intent.86 The EEOC's extension of the PDA to dependents
appears to be inconsistent with considerable evidence of congressional
intent to limit the scope of the Act to working women.8 7
A. []f an employer's insurance program covers the medical expenses of spouses of
female employees, then it must equally cover the medical expenses of spouses of male
employees, including those arising from pregnancy-related conditions.
But the insurance does not have to cover the pregnancy-related conditions of other
dependents as long as it excludes the pregnancy-related conditions of the dependents of
male and female employees equally. 29 C.F.R. § 1604 & app. (1982).
80. 44 Fed. Reg. 23,804 (1979).
To the extent that a specific question is not directly answered by a reading of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act existing principles of Title VIlI must be applied to resolve
that question. The legislative history of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act states explic-
itly that existing principles of Title VII law would have to be applied to resolve the
question of benefits for dependents ....
The Commission, being responsible for interpreting and implementing Title VII,
utilized Title VII principles to arrive at the position reached on the dependent question.
Id
81. See Comment, The Fregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 and the EEOC Guidelnes: A
Return to "Great Deference?", 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 735, 754-55 (1980). The Lockheed court as-
sumed that the EEOC's answer to question 21 was based on an erroneous interpretation of pre-
PDA Title VII principles. 680 F.2d at 1246 n.3.
82. The Commission probably applied the PDA because in the dependents' benefits cases, see
supra note 9, the EEOC has consistently argued that the PDA reaches dependents and requires
pregnancy coverage of spouses of male employees.
83. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-43 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
84. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971); see also Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975).
85. The Lockheed court rejected the Guidelines on the issue of extending the PDA to spouses
because of the EEOC's "erroneous view of pre-existing Title VII principles." 680 F.2d at 1246 n.3;
see aso General Elem. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 140-42 (rejecting the 1972 EEOC Guidelines on
pregnancy-related disabilities for employees).
86. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973). See general, Comment, supra
note 81.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 61-76.
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Finally, the Supreme Court has specified certain factors .to be con-
sidered when ascertaining the deference to be accorded agency inter-
pretations.88 Among them are the thoroughness of the agency's
consideration and the validity of its reasoning.89 In answering question
21, the EEOC failed to state the criteria on which it based its conclu-
sions, ignored the potential conflict between its answer and congres-
sional intent concerning the reach of the PDA, and neglected to explain
what it meant by "existing Title VII principles." If the Guidelines were
based on the Commission's interpretation of pre-PDA case law, the
EEOC neither explained nor justified which aspects of the "meander-
ing course' 90 of sex discrimination law it chose to apply. Because of
the uncertain basis on which the Commission formulated its answer
and insufficient evidence to demonstrate a thorough consideration and
careful reasoning of the critical issues involved, the EEOC's resolution
of the spousal pregnancy issue should not be viewed as dispositive.
III. TITLE VII PRINCIPLES
According to the Newport News court's interpretation of the PDA,
Congress viewed all pregnancy classifications and not merely those af-
fecting women employees as sex-based.9' The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit understandably had difficulty limiting the reach of the
PDA to female employees: under such a limitation, an employee's
pregnancy disability is per se sex-based, but a dependent's pregnancy
disability is not. The explanation for this ostensibly inconsistent treat-
ment of the same disability is that the PDA focuses primarily on the
employed woman affected by pregnancy, not on the risk of pregnancy
itself. A pregnancy classification outside the scope of the PDA could
nevertheless be successfully challenged under existing Title VII princi-
ples, using the analysis of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert. Although the
PDA overruled the Gilbert Court's specific holding on the validity of
excluding pregnancy coverage in an employee disability plan, the Gil-
bert analysis remains applicable to cases of pregnancy exclusion not
covered by the PDA.
A. Establishing Sex Discrimination Under 7tle VIl.
To determine whether the pregnancy exclusion in General Elec-
tric's disability-benefits plan discriminated against female employees,
88. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1974).
89. Id
90. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 148 (1977) (Powell, J.; concurring).
91. 667 F.2d 448, 451 (4th Cir. 1982).
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the Gilbert Court relied on the reasoning of Geduldig v. Aieio ,92 which
requires that the challenged plan affect one sex to the exclusion of the
other 93 The Court noted that the affected and nonaffected groups in
the General Electric disability plan were (1) pregnant women and (2)
nonpregnant women and men. Because these groups are not exclu-
sively identified with gender, the Court ruled that exclusion of preg-
nancy coverage in the disability plan was not gender-based. 94
When the Ninth Circuit decided in Lockheed that the PDA does
not reach dependents, it assumed that Gilbert established the validity of
all pregnancy exclusions not, covered by the PDA. 95 Using a Gilbert
analysis, however, it can be shown that some types of plans that ex-
clude coverage of spousal pregnancies may discriminate against male
employees.
For example, the medical insurance plan in Newport News fully
covered the hospitalization of employees' dependents, but provided re-
duced coverage for the pregnancy-related hospitalization of employees'
wives. In that situation, the two categories of employees to be com-
pared would be married men and married women.96 Only married
92. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
93. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 715 (1978)
('[Elach of the two groups of employees ... [must be] composed entirely and exclusively of
members of the same sex.")
94. 429 U.S. at 135-36.
95. 680 F.2d at 1247. •
96. In EEOC .Emerson Elec. Co., the court examined a plan similar to that in Newport
News. It followed the Gilbert analysis by dividing recipients into two groups-employees with -
pfegnant spouses and employees without pregnant spouses. The court concluded that because the
first group is exclusively male but the second is both male and female, the plan does not discrimi-
nate on the basis of sex. 539 F. Supp. 153, 158-59 (ED. Mo. 1982). The court's groupings, how-
ever, do not adhere to the criterion for comparing groups under section 703, that they be
"similarly situated." See Willingham v. Macon TeL Publishing, 507 F.2d 1084, 1088 (1975) (en
banc), in which the court analyzed the standards for determining sex discrimination under Title
VII ("has there been some form of discrimination, i.e., different treatment of similarly situated
individuals...."). To determine if a classification discriminates on the basis of spousal cover-
age, it follows that only married persons should be compared because the exclusion applies to
them only.
Moreover, the Emerson Electric court's literal transplanting of the Gilbert categories-preg-
nant women and nonpregnant persons-produces anomalous results when applied to previous sex
discrimination decisions. For example, in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971),
the Supreme Court ruled that an employer may not refuse to hire women with pre-school-age
children while hiring men with children of that age. If that decision were analyzed under the
Gilbert and Emerson E7ectric groupings, women with pre-school-age children would be in the
- disfavored group while men and women without pre-school-age children would be in the favored
group; thu no sex discrimination would be shown. The Supreme Court held, however, that Mar-
fin Marietta did'discriminate on the basis of sex because "[slection 703(a)... requires that per-
sons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespective of their sex." 400 U.S.
at 544. See alro Sprogis v. United Airlines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971) (illegal to refuse to hire married airline stewardesses while hiring married stewards) (under
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male employees would be in the disfavored group and only married
female employees in the favored group because females would receive
full coverage for spouses while male employees would not. Therefore,
the plan could be shown to discriminate against males within the af-
fected class of married persons. On the other hand, the Lockheed plan
excluded all dependents from pregnancy coverage, creating a disfa-
vored group of male employees whose wives and daughters are not
covered and female employees whose daughters are not covered; the
favored group consists of male and female employees whose depen-
dents are incapable of becoming pregnant. Because the Lockheed
groups do not divide along strict gender lines, the pregnancy exclusion
does not, on its face, discriminate against males. Thus, under Gilbert,
the validity of a pregnancy classification depends on the nature of he
insurance program involved.
B. Disparate Impact Analysis.
Although a Gilbert-type analysis of the Lockheed plan indicates
that its pregnancy classification does not discriminate along strict gen-
der lines, case law provides another avenue of attack. A classification
that is gender-neutral on its face violates Title VII if it has a substan-
tially disproportionate impact on one sex.97 Even so, a plaintiff chal-
lenging a Lockheed-type plan may have difficulty in presenting a
prima facie disparate impact case. Male employees are more likely to
bear the cost of a wife's pregnancy than female employees are for their
dependent daughters' pregnancies only if the comparable employees
each have the same number of dependents capable of becoming preg-
nant. That is, if a male employee has a wife and two sons and a female
employee has a husband and a daughter, the likelihood of the male
employee's bearing the cost of his wife's pregnancy is much greater
than the female's bearing the cost for her daughter.98 If, on the other
hand, the female employee has four daughters and the male employee
has one wife, it is more difficult to assume that one bears a greater risk
literal Gilbert groupings, married stewardesses would be in unfavored group while stewards and
unmarried stewardesses would be in favored group with no sex discrimination shown). Thus,
because of potentially anomolous results, it does not seem likely that the Gilbert court intended an
exact transplantation of its categories. Rather, because Gilbert speaks generally to the comparative
risks covered for male and female employees, 429 U.S. at 135, comparisons of those of "like
qualifications" should include married women, who receive full protection for their spouses, and
married men, who do not.
97. See supra note 19.
98. Coverage of dependents in employment plans typically includes spouses and children
under a certain age (the Lockheed plan sets at 19 the maximum age for coverage of dependents,
680 F.2d at 1247). Thus, although a male employee risks bearing the cost of his wife's pregnancy
during her entire fertile period, a female employee only risks the cost until her daughter is 19.
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of -iegnancy costs. Moreover, because many male employees' wives
work and may be covered under their own employers' benefit plan, the
impact of the pregnancy exclusion is further lessened.
Even if a benefits plan could be shown to affect male and female
employees differently, the Supreme Court's language in Gilbert sug-
gests that it views analysis of the effects of a pregnancy exclusion with
disfavor.9 In Gilbert, the Court analyzed only the risks included in the
coverage, rather than the risks excluded, and found that-as long as the
financial benefits of a plan did not discriminate against a class in terms
of aggregate risk protection, no Title VII discriminatory effect is
shown.1oo Thus, an insurance package must be "worth more" to one
sex than another,10' making a claim based on disparate impact nearly
impossible to prove. A male employee would have to show that the
financial benefits of a total insurance package are worth less to him
than to a similarly situated female employee. Such a showing could be
made through statistical evidence302 of total amounts of benefits re-
ceived, but it is highly unlikely that the exclusion of pregnancy cover-
age would reduce the benefits received by males to a level significantly
below that received by female employees.10 3
Assuming that a plaintiff could show that the package resulted in
unequal benefits, such a showing still might not be enough to establish
a prima facie.case of Title VII sex discrimination. The Supreme Court
has suggested that "[elven a completely neutral practice will inevitably
have some disproportionate impact on one group or another. This
Court has never held that discrimination must always be inferred from
such consequences."'0 4 Although the Court has not identified the cir-
99. "The [insurance] 'package'... covers exactly the same categories of risk, and is facially
nondiscriminatory in the sense that '[t]here is no risk from which men are protected and women
are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and men are not.'...
[Glender-based discrimination does not tesult simply because an employees... plan is less than
all-inclusive." 429 U.S. at 138-39.
100. See 429 U.S. 125, 138-40 (1976). See general Comment, Differential Treatment of Preg-
nancy in Employment. 7te Impact of Gilbart and Nashville Gas Co. v. Saty, 13 HARv. C. L-C.L.L.
REv. 717, 729.34 (1978).
101. 429 U.S. at 138.
102. Use of statistical evidence to prove disparate impact is common. See International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (statistical analyses serve an important
role). Courts differ as to how great a disproportionate impact must be shown. See general& Note,
Employpent Discrimnration-Plaintqs Prima Facie Case and Defendant's Rebuttal In a Dsparate
Impact Case, 54 Tut. L REV. 1187, 1191 n.34 (1980).
103. Exclusion of pregnancy benefits for employees under the General Electric Plan did not
result in female employees receiving significantly fewer benefits than males. In fact, evidence was
presented in the district court that even when women were not covered for pregnancy, it cost the
company more to insure an average female employee than a male employee. 129 U.S. at 131.
104. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710 n.20 (1978)
(emphasis in original see aso Delta Airlines v Kramarsky. 485 F Supp 300. 309 (S.D.N.Y
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cumstances under which discrimination will not be inferred, in Gil-
bert 10 5 and Sattyo6 it implied its disapproval of the disparate impact
test when the classification is pregnancy and the issue involves benefits,
rather than infringement on employment opportunities. In Gilbert,
Justice Rehnquist wondered whether proof of a discriminatory effect
was sufficient under section 703(a)(1), and whether a showing of intent
to discriminate might be required. 0 7 In Satty, the Court declined to
decide whether section 703(a)(1) required intent, but reaffirmed that
the impact test was appropriate when applied to section 703(a)(2),
which prohibits practices that deprive an individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise affect his status as an employee.108 Even if the
impact test remains valid for a section 703(a)(1) challenge, proof of dis-
criminatory impact will be difficult to sustain absent a showing that the
insurance plan does not pose distinct employment disadvantages for
one sex.
IV. CONCLUSION
The language and legislative history of the PDA support the inter-
pretation of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that the Act is
limited to female employees. There is strong evidence that Congress
intended the legislation to protect working women from discrimination
based on pregnancy, not to make all distinctions based on pregnancy a
violation of Title VII.
Challenges to exclusions of pregnancy benefits for dependents,
though outside the reach of the PDA, remain viable under existing Ti-
tle VII principles. If a plaintiff can show that a particular health plan
1980) (the Supreme Court has never adopted the view that an employment practice is illegal "sn-
ply" because it benefits members of one sex more than members of another) (emphasis from
court), rev'd on other grounds, 650 F.2d 1287 (2d Cir. 1981).
105. 429 U.S. at 137.
106. 434 U.S. at 144.
107. 429 U.S. at 137. See infrd note 108.
108. 434 U.S. at 144. Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII prohibits discrimination with regard to
compensation, terms, and privileges of employment; section 703(a)(2) prohibits practices that de-
prive an employee of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee. See supra note 1. Challenges to pregnancy classifications are usually brought under
section 703(a)(1).
Justice Rehnquist's dicta implies that the intent requirement of the discrimination cases
brought under the fourteenth amendment might be grafted onto a section 703(a)(1) challenge.
Because intent is more difficult to prove, there has been some feeling that the Court is attempting
to dilute the impact test. In his concurring opinion in Gilbert, Justice Blackmun refused to join the
majority's implication, if there was one, that the effects test was no longer good law. 429 U.S. at
146. Although other disparate effects cases do not mention a possible dilution of the test, see
Williams, supra note 8, at 675, those cases do not concern a pregnancy classification. See generally
Comment, Dferential Treatment of Pregnancy supra note 100, at 744-49.
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discriminates along strict gender lines, he can establish a prima facie
case under Gilbert. If, on the other hand, a health plan excludes preg-
nancy coverage for all dependents, it is unlikely that Gilbert will permit
a successful challenge. Not only would a plaintiff be unable to demon-
strate strict gender groupings, he would also find it difficult to over-
come the proof problems of disparate impact analysis created by the
Supreme Court in Gilbert. A plaintiff's success depends, therefore, on
the specific provisions of the challenged plan.
Gusti W. Frankel
